Welfare Family Caps and the Zero-Grant Situation by Dinkel, Christopher
Cornell Law Review
Volume 96
Issue 2 January Article 10
Welfare Family Caps and the Zero-Grant Situation
Christopher Dinkel
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Christopher Dinkel, Welfare Family Caps and the Zero-Grant Situation, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 365 (2011)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol96/iss2/10
NOTE
WELFARE FAMILY CAPS AND THE ZERO-
GRANT SITUATION
Christopher Dinkelt
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 366
I. WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES ........................ 370
A. History of W elfare .................................. 370
B. Welfare Reform and the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ...... 371
II. W ELFARE FAMILY CAPS................................... 372
A. History of Family Caps................ ......... 372
B. The Maximum Family Grant (MFG) Rule........... 374
1. Operation of the MFG Rule. ................... 374
2. Zero-Grant Situation Under the MEG Rule .......... 376
3. General Assistance for MEG Children in the Zero-
Grant Situation ............................ 377
C. Criticism of Family Caps ....................... 380
1. The Punitive Purpose of Family Caps ............. 380
2. The Myth of the "Welfare Queen" ................ 381
3. Harmful Health Effects of Family Caps ............. 382
III. COURT CHALLENGES TO FAMILY CAPS .................... 383
A. Federal Courts . ............................... 383
B. State Courts .............................. 384
1. Federal Constitutional Rights ................... 384
2. State Constitutional Rights .................... 386
3. Calfornia ................................ 387
IV. PROBLEMS WITH FAMILY CAPS IN THE ZERo-GRANT
SITUATION .............................................. 388
A. Flawed Legal Reasoning ........................ 388
1. Not Completely Depriving Families of Welfare
Benefits.... ..................... ...... 388
2. Putting Families on Welfare on Par with Working
Families ... ................................. 389
t B.A., Pomona College, 2007; J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2011; Articles
Editor, Cornell Law Review, Volume 96. 1 wish to thank my family, especially my Mom and
my Dad, for their love and support. I also wish to thank Robin Shin, Michael Potere, Luan
Huynh, and Ed Barnes for their helpful suggestions for this Note. Finally, I am grateful to
the members of the Cornell Law Review, particularly Alex Coedo, Kelly Vaughan, Britt Ham-
ilton, Charles Brown, and Eduardo Bruera for their work on this Note.
365
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
B. Flawed Public Policy ... ....................... 390
1. Reducing Poverty ........................... 390
2. Strengthening Families ....................... 393
V. POTENTIAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS.................. .......... 394
A. Federal Legislative Solutions .. .................. 394
1. Congressional Family Cap Prohibition ............. 394
2. Federal Legislative Exception for the Zero-Grant
Situation ... ...................... ..... 394
B. State Legislative Solutions ...................... 394
1. State Family Cap Prohibitions.. ................ 394
2. State Legislative Exceptions for the Zero-Grant
Situation ................................. 395
CONCLUSION ................................................... 395
INTRODUCTION
Dajohn is a nine-year-old child who is in desperate need of finan-
cial assistance.' His mother, Drusilla, is disabled and cannot find em-
ployment. 2 As a result, Drusilla cannot afford to care for Dajohn, and
his basic needs are often unmet.3 Contributing to their dire financial
situation, Drusilla spent what little money she had on moving out of
their public housing because the mold in their furniture severely ag-
gravated Dajohn's asthma.4 Drusilla also had to purchase clothes for
Dajohn to replace the ones that the mold had infected.5 Although
the family receives food stamps to help make ends meet, the food
stamps often do not last until the end of the month.6 Consequently,
the family must subsist on Ramen noodles and expired canned
goods.7 Although these foods upset Dajohn's stomach, they are all
the family can afford.8
Drusilla previously received $398 per month for her older son
Derrick as part of a grant from a California welfare program called
CalWORKs, which provides aid to indigent families with children.9
Because Drusilla was receiving welfare when she gave birth to Dajohn
1 Petitioners' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for Writ
of Mandate at 1, McCormick v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. RG08415945 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 8,
2009) (unpublished decision) [hereinafter McCormick Memorandum], available at http://
apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/html/index.html.
2 Id. at 3.
3 See id.
4 Id. Drusilla used much of her Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which she re-
ceived for her disability, on these moving expenses. Id.
5 Id.
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 2-3; see also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11200 (West 2010) (establishing
CalWORKs).
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in July 2000, a CaiWORKs "family cap" called the Maximum Family
Grant (MFG) rule prohibited her from receiving additional money for
Dajohn.10 She had to then care for both Derrick and Dajohn with
Derrick's $398 grant." When Derrick left the household in January
2008, the family's monthly CalWORKs grant dropped to $0 because of
the family cap. 12 The family cap blocked Drusilla from receiving any
financial assistance for Dajohn, who otherwise met the eligibility re-
quirements for a CalWORKs grant.' 3
Drusilla then turned to a Social Services Agency worker for
help. 4 The worker explained that Dajohn could receive financial as-
sistance if someone else cared for him.' 5 With Derrick no longer at
home, Drusilla was determined not to also lose Dajohn.' 6 What
Dajohn needed was not foster care but financial assistance to help him
purchase the basic necessities of life, such as clothes, shoes, and
school supplies.' 7 The family cap, however, denied Dajohn that des-
perately needed assistance.' 8
When families that are receiving welfare assistance give birth to
additional children, their monthly welfare grants do not increase be-
cause those additional, "capped" children are ineligible for a welfare
grant.'9 As a result of family cap policies, families often have to share
resources for their children, just as Drusilla had to split the $398 grant
between Derrick and Dajohn.20 Dajohn's situation illustrates, how-
10 McCormick Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2; see also WELF. 8 INST. § 11450.04
(establishing the MFG rule and explaining that "[flor purposes of determining the maxi-
mum aid payment ... the number of needy persons in the same family shall not be in-
creased for any child born into a family that has received aid under this chapter
continuously for the 10 months prior to the birth of the child"); CAL. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS.,
MANUAL OF POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: ELIGIBILIY AND ASSISTANCE STANDARDS § 44-314.2
(2009) [hereinafter MPP], available at http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/ord/entres/getinfo/
pdf/12EAS.pdf (outlining the application of the MFG rule).
1I McCormick Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2-3.
12 Id. at 3.
13 Id. at 1-2.
14 Id. at 3.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 See id. at 3.
18 See id. at 1-3.
19 See, e.g., Melynda G. Broomfield, Note, Controlling the Reproductive Rights ofImpover-
ished Women: Is This the Way to "Reform" Welfare?, 16 B.C. THIRD WAORLD L.J. 217, 227 (1996)
(explaining that a "'family cap' refers to a program whereby a mother already receiving
[welfare] would be prevented from getting an increase in the standard monthly cash grant
if she gives birth to another baby").
20 See McCormick Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that the $398 grant
Drusilla received for Derrick did not increase after Dajohn was born). Indeed, one justifi-
cation for family caps is to discourage families receiving welfare from having more children
by making them share the welfare grant of their children who are not subject to the family
cap with their children who are. See, e.g., Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform:
Their Coercive Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 154 (2006)
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ever, one of the most severe, although perhaps unforeseen, side ef-
fects of welfare family caps: in certain situations, family caps can block
families with children who are otherwise eligible for a welfare grant
from receiving any financial assistance to purchase basic necessities.21
As Dajohn's situation demonstrates, the operation of family caps
can completely deprive parents of welfare grants when their oldest
children leave the household and only capped children remain. This
deprivation occurs when a noncapped child reaches adult age and be-
comes ineligible for welfare, or when a noncapped child leaves the
household to go into foster care and only capped children remain in
the household.22
When family caps completely deprive otherwise eligible families
of all financial assistance, they thwart the public policy goals of reduc-
ing poverty and strengthening families on welfare.23 This complete
deprivation of welfare funds could have grave health effects for the
significant number of capped children in the United States. 24 Com-
pletely denying financial assistance to families in need also undercuts
a central justification of family caps: that families will be able to share
the welfare benefits of noncapped children with capped children.25
Family cap policies and their effects are particularly important in
light of current political debates regarding the proper role of welfare,
especially in states like California that have recently faced significant
("The obvious purpose of a family cap is to discourage low-income women receiving wel-
fare from having children . . . .").
21 Here, "financial assistance" refers to a cash welfare grant. It does not include food
stamps or health care, such as Medicaid.
22 For example, under CaIWORKs, children are ordinarily eligible for aid only until
they turn eighteen or until they turn nineteen provided they are a full-time student and
will graduate from high school or a vocational training program before their nineteenth
birthday. CALWORKs PoLIcY, CW 42.101-.101.2 (2010), http://www.ladpss.org/dpss/cal
works/cwPolicy08-30-10.pdf. Families also cannot receive CalWORKs benefits for children
who leave the home to go into foster care. See id. at CW 82-812.68.
23 See, e.g., Sojourner A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 794 A.2d 822, 824 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2002) (finding legitimate state interests for family caps to be "breaking the
cycle of poverty" and "strengthening families").
24 See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., WELFARE POIcCY AND REPRODUCTIVE
HEALTH: "CAPPING" A FAMILY'S BENEFITS 3 (1999) [hereinafter CAPPING A FAMILY'S BENE-
FITS], available at http://www.kff.org/womenshealth/loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/secur-
ity/getfile.cfm&PageID=13282 (discussing the possible health effects of reduced welfare
benefits for children). One government study in 2000 found that 108,000 families in
twenty states were subject to family caps in an average month; some commentators believe
that the actual number is much larger. See Smith, supra note 20, at 170 (citing U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-924, WELFARE REFoRM: MORE RESEARCH NEEDED ON TANF
FAMILY CAPS AND OTHER POLICIES FOR REDUCING OUT-OF-WEDLOCK BIRTHS 13 (2001)).
25 See, e.g., C.K v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1013 (D.N.J. 1995) (concluding that a
family cap "does ... [not] completely deprive children of benefits which they might other-
wise receive but for the conduct of their parents" but instead merely "permit[s] any addi-
tional child to share in [the] 'capped' family income").
[Vol. 96:365368
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budget deficits.2 6 The issue also has a considerable national dimen-
sion because roughly one third of the states have a family cap provi-
sion27 and because Congress has left states free to implement them in
their welfare programs.28
Part I of this Note examines the history of welfare and welfare
reform in the United States. Part II explores the history of welfare
family caps. It discusses the status of family caps after federal welfare
reform in 1996. It also analyzes the MFG rule, CalWORKs' family cap.
Using the MFG rule as a case study, it examines what this Note calls
the "zero-grant situation," which arises when families' monthly welfare
grants are $0 as a result of a family cap, even though their capped
children technically are welfare participants. This Part then high-
lights criticism of family caps. Part III discusses judicial challenges to
family caps. Part IV analyzes how the zero-grant situation demon-
strates the flaws in courts' reasoning in rejecting legal challenges to
family caps. It also criticizes the use of family caps on public policy
grounds. Part V examines federal and state legislative solutions. It
calls for Congress to reexamine its decision to allow states to impose
family caps under Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF),
the broader federal welfare program that encompasses individual
state welfare programs like CalWORKs.29 Specifically, this Part urges
Congress to pass legislation to prohibit states from enacting family
caps.30 Alternatively, this Part recommends that Congress create an
exception to family caps that would provide some amount of financial
assistance to families in the zero-grant situation. Finally, this Part calls
for states to either eliminate family caps on their own or to create an
exception for the zero-grant situation at the state level.
26 See, e.g., Daniel B. Wood, California Faces $19 Billion Budget Deficit Despite Massive
Cuts, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR (Junie 22, 2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/
0622/California-faces-19-billion-budget-deficit-despite-massive-cuts (discussing California's
$19.1 billion budget deficit).
27 See GRETCHEN ROWE & MARY MURPHY, THE URBAN INST., WELFARE RULES DATABOOK:
STATE TANF POLICIES AS OF JULY 2008, at 142-43 (2009), http://anfdata.urban.org/data
books/Databook%202008%20FINAL.pdf (listing states' family cap policies).
28 See Smith, supra note 20, at 153-54 (explaining that the federal legislation that
enacted welfare reform in 1996, "by remaining silent, allowed states to continue utilizing
existing family cap policies or enact new caps without federal oversight").
29 See LEGAL MOMENTUM, IMPROVING THE FEDERAL SAFETY NET FOR WOMEN AND CHIL-
DREN: AN AGENDA FOR TANF REFORM 2 (2009), http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/
pdfs/Im-tanf-reform-agenda.pdf (calling for a ban on family caps).
30 See id. (urging Congress to prohibit family caps).
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I.
WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES
A. History of Welfare
The first modern federal welfare legislation in the United States
was the Social Security Act of 1935.31 In addition to creating other
public benefit programs like old-age assistance and unemployment
compensation, the Social Security Act established Aid to Dependent
Children (ADC).32 The purpose of ADC was to provide aid for chil-
dren whose fathers had died.33 ADC did so by providing federal assis-
tance to states by extending "mother's pensions," which were welfare
programs that many states had previously established.34 Conse-
quently, ADC was small and provided relief almost solely to white wid-
ows. 3 5 After World War II, the number of ADC recipients rose
considerably,36 but until the 1960s, many poor, single mothers could
not obtain any financial assistance because they fell outside ADC's
coverage.37
The scope of federal welfare assistance expanded considerably
under President Lyndon Johnson, as the Great Society programs he
instituted aimed to drastically reduce poverty.38 Against this back-
drop, welfare-rights advocates achieved significant legal victories when
federal courts invalidated certain laws that restricted welfare.39 Dur-
ing this period, women of color and individuals who were unmarried,
divorced, or separated gained greater access to welfare, especially
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the new ver-
sion of ADC.40
31 See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935); JOEL F.
HANDLER, THE POVERTY OF WELFARE REFORM 21 (1995).
32 See Social Security Act §§ 401-406, 49 Stat. at 627-29 (establishing ADC); id. § 1,
49 Stat. at 620 (establishing old-age assistance); id. § 301, 49 Stat. at 626 (establishing un-
employment compensation benefits); JEFFREY GROGGER & LYNN A. KAROLY, WELFARE RE-
FORM: EFFECTS OF A DECADE OF CHANGE 10 (2005); Kelly J. Gastley, Note, Why Family Cap
Laws just Aren't Getting It Done, 46 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 373, 375-77 & n. 12 (2004).
33 GROGGER & KAROLY, supra note 32, at 11.
34 See id. at 10-11.
35 See HANDLER, supra note 31, at 23, 25.
36 See Risa E. Kaufman, The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare Queen "- Using State Constitu-
tions to Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 301, 306 & n.26
(1997) (stating that the number of families receiving ADC increased from 371,000 in 1940
to 803,000 in 1960).
37 HANDLER, supra note 31, at 28.
38 See Lyke Thompson & Donald F. Norris, Introduction: The Politics of Welfare Reform, in
THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 1, 5 (Donald F. Norris & Lyke Thompson eds., 1995).
39 HANDLER, supra note 31, at 28; see, e.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 312 & n.3, 313,
334 (1968) (holding Alabama's regulation that denied federal welfare assistance to chil-
dren of mothers who "cohabitated" with any single or married able-bodied man to be inva-
lid as conflicting with § 406 of the Social Security Act of 1935).
40 See HANDLER, supra note 31, at 28-29; Kaufman, supra note 36, at 307. AFDC re-
placed ADC in 1962. Kaufman, supra note 36, at 305 n.15; see also Public Welfare Amend-
[Vol. 96:365370
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Control over welfare programs began to shift from the federal
government to the states in the 1980s.4 1 Under the Family Support
Act of 1988,42 the focus of welfare also changed from providing
mothers with income maintenance to preparing them for the
workforce.4 3 Additionally, states started to require AFDC mothers to
obtain employment outside the home. 44
B. Welfare Reform and the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
With the support of the Republican congressional leaders, who
pledged to reform welfare as part of their "Contract with America,"
President Clinton signed the Conference Agreement for H.R. 3734,
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 (PRWORA), on August 22, 1996.45 PRWORA abolished
AFDC and created Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) .46 In doing so, PRWORA greatly scaled back the extent of
federal welfare assistance and passed even more responsibility from
the federal government to the states to design and administer welfare
programs for families with children. 4 7 Under AFDC, the federal gov-
ernment matched every dollar that a state spent on welfare programs
with between one and four dollars of federal funds.4 8 Under TANF,
however, the federal government instead gives each state a fixed block
grant that does not change in size, regardless of the amount of money
ments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 104(a)(3), 76 Stat. 172, 185 (1962) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (replacing ADC with AFDC). By
1971, widows comprised only 4.3% of AFDC recipients. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of
Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 725 (1992).
41 Thompson & Norris, supra note 38, at 6.
42 Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988).
43 See Cheryl Sullivan, Welfare in America: What Is Being Reformed?, 11 NOTRE DAMEJ.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 633, 634 (1997).
44 See Kaufman, supra note 36, at 307-08.
45 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); see also Hugh Heclo, The Politics of Wel-
fare Reform, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 169 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds.,
2001) (discussing the political dimensions of welfare reform); Sullivan, supra note 43, at
635-36 (discussing congressional negotiations regarding welfare reform and President
Clinton's signing of PRWORA).
46 See 110 Stat. 2105; Smith, supra note 20, at 153.
47 See LAURA LEIN & DEANNA T. SCHEXNAYDER, LIFE AFTER WELFARE: REFORM AND THE
PERSISTENCE OF POVERTY 12 (2007) (stating that under PRWORA, "[w]ithin general guide-
lines from the federal government, states were able to develop and adopt their own plans,
and they did so, often pursuing somewhat diverse philosophies about what measures were
most important"); Christopher Jencks, Foreword to KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING
ENDS MEET: How SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND Low-WAGE WORK iX, Xvi (1997)
(stating that the legislation that President Clinton signed "gives states a lot of freedom to
design their own TANF rules"); Sullivan, supra note 43, at 636 (stating that under TANF,
"eligibility and benefit levels may now be determined by individual states").
48 See Jencks, supra note 47, at xvi.
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that each state spends.4 9 As a result, states that desire to provide more
than the block grant amount must do so out of their own funds.50
TANF has a maintenance of effort (MOE) requirement under
which each state must spend at least 75% of the amount it spent
under AFDC.51 However, states increasingly count money spent on
other programs, as well as expenditures by nongovernmental entities,
towards their MOE requirement.5 2 Thus, researchers have found that
while the total amount that states count towards their MOE require-
ment has increased since 2001, the amount that states have spent on
nonmedical social services has declined.53
II.
WELFARE FAMILY CAPS
A. History of Family Caps
A "family cap" is a welfare provision that prohibits parents who
are currently receiving welfare for their child from receiving an in-
crease in their monthly welfare grant following the birth of another
child.54 Under AFDC, states that wanted to implement family caps
had to obtain a waiver from the federal government.55 If a state did
not obtain this waiver, it violated the Social Security Act by impermissi-
bly including behavior-based criteria in its eligibility determination.56
Nineteen states received AFDC waivers from the Department of
Health and Human Services and subsequently adopted family cap
policies.57
49 Id. at xvi-xvii; ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, CTR. FOR LAw & Soc. PoLICY, LOOKING
AHEAD To TANF REAUTHORIZATION 2 (2009), http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publica-
tions/files/LookingAhead-to-TANF-Reauthorization.pdf.
50 Jencks, supra note 47, at xvii.
51 ELIZABETH LOWER-BASCH, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. Poucy, GOALS FOR TANF
REAUTHORIZATION 7 (2010), http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/TANF-
Reauthorization-Goals.pdf. States must spend 80% of their AFDC expenditure on their
MOE requirement if they do not meet certain work participation-rate requirements. Id.
52 Id.
53 See id.
54 See Broomfield, supra note 19, at 227.
55 See Williams, supra note 40, at 721 ("Because projects that condition eligibility on
behavior contravene the mandated eligibility requirements set forth in the Social Security
Act, they require the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to
waive the entitlement provisions under 42 U.S.C. § 1315." (footnote omitted)).
56 See id. at 721 & n.11. Under 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(10) (A) (1994) (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 602 (2006)), which provides that "aid to families with dependent children
shall ... be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals," states had to
obtain an AFDC waiver to enact family caps because they were not permitted to alter the
Social Security Act's categorical eligibility requirements. See id.
57 SHELLEY STARK & JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAw & Soc. POLICY, EXCLUDED
CHILDREN: FAMILY CAP IN A NEW ERA 18 n.2 (1999). The nineteen states were: Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, NewJersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennes-
372 [Vol. 96:365
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Family caps became a part of the congressional debate regarding
welfare reform in 1995.58 While the House of Representatives passed
initial welfare reform legislation that required each state to adopt a
family cap, 59 the Senate rejected that mandatory cap provision.60 As a
compromise, the House and Senate conference report included a
mandatory family cap requirement for states unless they specifically
opted out.6' President Clinton vetoed that legislation, and the House
and Senate then adopted mandatory family caps in their subsequent
attempts at welfare reform legislation.62 However, due to a procedu-
ral violation, the final bill President Clinton signed in August 1996 did
not include a family cap provision.63 Through its silence regarding
family caps, the final bill permitted states to continue to use their ex-
isting family cap policies or to adopt new ones that were free from
federal regulation.64
Lawmakers have since made several attempts to limit states' free-
dom to implement family caps, but none have been successful. In
1998, Representative Chris Smith [R-NJ] introduced a bill to prohibit
states from receiving TANF funds if they adopted or planned to adopt
family caps.65 Representative Patsy Mink [D-H11 introduced legisla-
tion in 2001 that would have penalized states that used family caps.66
In 2003, Representative Dennis Kucinich [D-OH] sponsored legisla-
see, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. Kansas obtained a waiver and passed legislation to imple-
ment the provision but chose not to because the new federal law required time limits for
cash grants. Id.
58 See Smith, supra note 20, at 153.
59 See id.
60 See H.R. 4, 104th Cong. § 101 (1995) (as passed by Senate, Sept. 19, 1995); Smith,
supra note 20, at 153.
61 See 141 CONG. REc. H15323, H15402 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995); Smith, supra note 20,
at 153.
62 Smith, supra note 20, at 153.
63 See 2 U.S.C. § 644 (1994); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcili-
ation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996); 141 CONG. REc. H8903 (daily
ed. July 30, 1996); 141 CONG. REC. S8506-07 (daily ed. June 15, 1995); Smith, supra note
20, at 153.
64 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act; STARK &
LEVIN-EPSTEIN, supra note 63, at 6; Smith, supra note 20, at 153-54.
65 Jodie Levin-Epstein, Lifting the Lid Off the Family Cap: States Revisit Problematic Policy
for Welfare Mothers, CLASP POLICY BRIEF: CHILDBEARING AND REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH SERIES,
BRIEF No. 1, Dec. 2003, at 1, 4, http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/publications/files/0
1 6 6
.
pdf- see also H.R. 4066, 105th Cong. (1998) (prohibiting states from using TANF funds if
they enacted family caps). Representative Smith explained his reasons for opposing family
caps: "[I]f we want welfare to be temporary and to be a true safety net-a safety net against
abortion under duress, a safety net against descent into deeper poverty, then we must ban
the family cap. . . . It is wrong for the government, whether it be federal, state, or local to
embrace policies that would promote abortion and financial impoverishment. The family
cap does just that." 144 CONG. REc. E1142-01 (daily ed. June 16, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Christopher H. Smith).
66 See H.R. 3113, 107th Cong. § 405 (2001) (penalizing each state that uses family caps
by reducing its TANF grant by 5%); Levin-Epstein, supra note 65, at 4.
3732011]
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tion that would have reduced each state's TANF grant by 5% if the
state "penalize[d] the birth of a child."67 Each bill failed to pass the
House of Representatives. 68
Five states continued their AFDC family cap policies after the es-
tablishment of TANF.69 Other states, however, elected to discontinue
their existing AFDC waivers to free themselves of their monitoring
and reporting obligations under AFDC. 70 While some states have sub-
sequently enacted family caps under TANF, a number of states have
eliminated their family caps altogether.7 1 For example, Maryland pre-
viously had a family cap but chose to distribute funds to selected non-
profit third-party payees to purchase goods for the capped children.72
However, it ended its program in October 200273 and stopped apply-
ing its family cap in September 2004.74 Illinois also passed legislation
in 2003 to discontinue its family cap starting in January 2004.75 Addi-
tionally, Nebraska repealed its family cap in 2007.76
B. The Maximum Family Grant (MFG) Rule
1. Operation of the MEG Rule
The MFG rule is CalWORKs' family cap.77 CalWORKs provides
cash grants to indigent families with children.78 Generally, adults in
California may only receive aid for themselves from CalWORKs for a
total of sixty months, but their children, if eligible, may continue to
67 See H.R. REP. No. 108-9 (2003), reprinted in CONG. REc. H513-23 (daily ed. Feb. 13,
2003) (Patsy Mink Memorial TANF Reauthorization Act); Levin-Epstein, supra note 65,
at 4.
68 Levin-Epstein, supra note 65, at 4.
69 See Smith, supra note 20, at 154 n.11.
70 Id. at 154.
71 Id. at 154 & nn.11-12.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See Family Cap Policies, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
IssuesResearch/HumanServices/WelfareReformFamilyCapPolicies/tabid/16306/Default.
aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2010); Levin-Epstein, supra note 65, at 4; RowE & MuRPHY, supfa
note 27, at 142, 143 n.8.
75 See Levin-Epstein, supra note 65, at 4; Family Cap Policies, supra note 74.
76 See Diana Romero & Madina Ag6nor, US Fertility Prevention as Poverty Prevention: An
Empirical Question and SocialJustice Issue, 19 WOMEN's HEALTH IssuEs 355, 356 (2009); ROWE
& MuRPHY, supra note 27, at 142.
77 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04 (West 2010); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-
314.2 (establishing the MFG rule).
78 See CalWORKs, CAL. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., http://www.ladpss.org/dpss/calworks/
(last visited Aug. 1, 2010). There are basic deprivation requirements and income and re-
source limits to make a family eligible for CaIWORKs. See CalWorks Eligibility, CAL. DEPT OF
Soc. SERVS., http://www.ladpss.org/dpss/calworks/eligibility.cfm (last visited Aug. 1,
2010); CALWORKs PoLIcY, supra note 22, at CW-44-207.1-2 (explaining financial
eligibility).
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receive aid beyond sixty months.79 The cash grant that a family re-
ceives each month is the difference between the family's reasonably
anticipated "Net Nonexempt Income" (NNI) 80 and the Maximum Aid
Payment (MAP) for the Assistance Unit (AU), which is the number of
family members in the household for purposes of calculating the
grant.8' For instance, if a family of two, living in region 1, has no
income and therefore an NNI of 0, it will normally receive $627 per
month, the MAP for an AU of 2.82 Likewise, a family of three with no
income will normally receive $776 per month, the MAP for an AU of
3.183 The potential CalWORKs grant may vary depending on family
size, region, and other factors, such as the MFG rule.8 4
Under the MFG rule, a child born into a family that received
CalWORKs cash aid for the ten months prior to that child's birth with-
out a break in aid for two or more months is not a part of the AU for
purposes of determining the family's MAP to calculate the grant
amount.85 Children subject to the MFG rule still retain technical eligi-
bility for ancillary CalWORKs benefits, such as child care if the parent
is working or $10 per month in special-needs payments if the child has
a qualifying condition, such as special dietary requirements like low-
calorie or salt diets, special travel expenses related to a medical diffi-
79 See CalWORKs Time Limits, CAL. DEP'T OF Soc. SERVS., http://www.ladpss.org/dpss/
calworks/timelimits.cfm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
80 "Net Nonexempt Income" includes "all earned income and disability-based
unearned income less applicable disregards, plus any unearned income." MPP, supra note
10, § 44-315. 1.11.
81 See WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450(a); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-315.31-.38 (detailing
how to calculate the amount of a grant).
82 See MPP, supra note 10, § 44-315.321; CCWRO 2010 Public Assistance Tables, CAL.
COAL. OF WELFARE RIGHTS ORG., INC. [hereinafter Public Assistance Tables], http://www.cc-
wro.org/images/2010-pat.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2010). This amount represents a grant
level for families who live in region 1 (which includes most major metropolitan areas in
California) and who either are exempt from work participation requirements or are fami-
lies in which only the children receive aid. California's nonexempt grant amounts are less
than the exempt grant amounts. The nonexempt grant amounts in region 1 are currently
$561 for a family of two and $694 for a family of three. See id. (listing exempt and nonex-
empt grant amounts); see also CalWORKs: Cash Aid for Families with Children, CONTRA COSTA
CN-ry. EMP'T & HUMAN SERVs. DEP'T 4 (Jan. 2010), http://www.ehsd.org/work/pdfs/Cal
WORKs%20Facts%20Sheet-Rev011410.pdf (explaining qualifications for exempt and non-
exempt grant levels).
83 See MPP, supra note 10, § 44-315.321; Public Assistance Tables, supra note 82 (listing
grant amount for an exempt family of three in region 1 in California).
84 SeeWELF. & INST. CODE §§ 11450(a), 11450.04; MPP, supra note 10, §§ 44-314.2, 44-
315.31-38.
85 WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04; MPP, supra note 10, § 44-314.2.
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culty, or telephone services for a hearing impairment. 6 However, cer-
tain exemptions make the MFG rule inapplicable.8 7
2. Zero-Grant Situation Under the MFG Rule
A family can have children who are eligible for CalWORKs yet
still receive a monthly cash grant of $0 because of the MFG rule. To
illustrate this zero-grant situation, suppose that a family satisfies the
income and eligibility requirements for CalWORKs. The mother does
not qualify for CaIWORKs because, for instance, she has already re-
ceived aid under the program for sixty months.88 She therefore does
not count as a member of her family's AU for purposes of determin-
ing the MAP. 89 She has one child for whom she is receiving aid. She
then has a second child while continuously receiving aid for the first
child during the ten months prior to the birth of the second child.
The second child is subject to the MFG rule and is therefore not a
part of the AU for purposes of determining the MAP.90 Suppose then
that the first child reaches the CalWORKs age limit or leaves the home
and goes into foster care. The first child's CalWORKs eligibility does
not transfer to the second child because the second child is consid-
ered a capped child. The mother is not working, so she cannot re-
ceive benefits to cover child care for the second child. The second
child does not have any qualifying "special needs" to receive the $10
per month in special-needs payments. In this situation, the AU to de-
termine the MAP is zero, and the MAP is therefore zero. Conse-
quently, the family's monthly CalWORKs grant is $0 even though
86 See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 8263(b) (2) (West 2009) (establishing payment of child care
benefits to families who are income eligible); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-315.4-.5 (establish-
ing payment of "special needs payments"); see also CALWORKs Poucy, supra note 22, at
CW-44-314.1 (discussing application of the MFG rule); id. at CW-44-21 1 (discussing "special
needs").
87 See, e.g., WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(f); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-314.3.31 (es-
tablishing that recipients must receive notice of MFG rule); WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11450.04(a); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-314.3.32 (exempting for two month break in aid in
the ten months prior to birth of MFG child); WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(d)(1); MPP,
supra note 10, § 44-314.4 (exempting for family living off of aid for twenty-four consecutive
months while child lived with family); WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(b)(1)-(2); MPP,
supra note 10, § 44-314.5.51-.52 (exempting for child conceived due to rape or incest);
WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.04(b)(3); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-314.5.53 (exempting for
child conceived due to certain types of contraceptive failure); WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11450.04(d)(2); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-314.5.54 (exempting for child if, when con-
ceived, either parent was an "unaided nonparent caretaker relative"); WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 11450.04(d) (3); MPP, supra note 10, § 44-314.5.55 (exempting for child who does not
live with either parent); id. § 44-314.5.56 (exempting for teen parent who moves out of AU
and establishes own AU).
88 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
89 See CAL.WORs PoucY, supra note 22, at CW-82-832 (detailing persons who must be
excluded from the AU). See generally CalWORKs Time Limits, supra note 79 (outlining sixty-
month limit on adults receiving aid).
90 See MPP, supra note 10, § 44-314.2.
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there is one child in the household who is otherwise eligible for
CalWORKs.
3. General Assistance for MFG Children in the Zero-Grant Situation
To try to obtain at least some financial support, some MFG chil-
dren in the zero-grant situation have unsuccessfully applied for Gen-
eral Assistance (GA),91 a form of public assistance in California that
some counties refer to as General Relief. 2 Whereas CaIWORKs is a
grant for indigent families with children, GA is a loan that is typically
provided to indigent adults.9 3  California Welfare and Institutions
Code (WIC) section 17000 establishes GA:
Every county and every city and county shall relieve and support all
incompetent, poor, indigent persons, and those incapacitated by
age, disease, or accident, lawfully resident therein, when such per-
sons are not supported and relieved by their relatives or friends, by
their own means, or by state hospitals or other state or private
institutions. 94
WIC section 10000 outlines the purpose of the GA statute: " [T]o
provide for protection, care, and assistance . . . and to promote the
welfare and happiness of all of the people of the state by providing
appropriate aid and services to all of its needy and distressed."9 5 Con-
sequently, California courts have concluded that the GA statute "im-
poses a mandatory duty upon the county to support its indigent and
disabled persons."9 6
In McCormick v. County of Alameda, a recent California superior
court case, the court addressed the issue of allowing MFG children to
91 See, e.g., McCormick Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3 (explaining that Drusilla ap-
plied for GA but was denied because Dajohn was "eligible" for CaIWORKS).
92 See General Assistance or General Relief CAL. DEP'T OF Soc. SERvS., http://www.dss.
cahwnet.gov/cdssweb/PG132.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2010).
93 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450 (West 2010); General Assistance or General Relief
supra note 92; see also WELF. & INST. CODE § 17300 (requiring reimbursement for the GA
loan).
94 WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000.
95 Id. § 10000.
96 Jennings v. Jones, 165 Cal. App. 3d 1083, 1092 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (emphasis in
original). California courts have repeatedly struck down county regulations restricting the
scope of the GA statutes. See, e.g., Mooney v. Pickett, 483 P.2d 1231, 1240-41 (Cal. 1971)
(striking down a county regulation denying GA to unmarried persons on the sole ground
that they were "employable"); Arenas v. San Diego Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 93 Cal. App.
4th 210, 214, 217 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (striking down a San Diego ordinance preventing all
individuals convicted of a drug felony after August 22, 1996, from receiving GA); Clay v.
Tryk, 177 Cal. App. 3d 119, 124-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (invalidating a county regulation
that excluded GA recipients who were members of a shared household from receiving
housing and utility benefits unless all the members of the household were GA recipients);
Bernhardt v. Bd. of Supervisors, 58 Cal. App. 3d 806, 810-11 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (invali-
dating a county regulation denying GA to "young adults" absent "exceptional
circumstances").
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receive GA when the family's monthly cash grant is $0.97 In that case,
Drusilla had been receiving a $398 monthly CaIWORKs grant for her
son, Derrick.9 8 She then gave birth to Dajohn, for whom she could
not receive any cash aid because of the MFG rule even though Dajohn
was otherwise eligible for CalWORKs aid.99 After Derrick left the
household, Drusilla applied for GA for Dajohn. 00 The Social Services
Agency denied the request. 01 An administrative hearing officer up-
held the denial, contending that even though Dajohn could not re-
ceive a monthly CalWORKs cash grant, he was technically "eligible"
for ancillary CalWORKs benefits such as child care and special-needs
payments. 102 Drusilla appealed the administrative hearing officer's
decision to the Alameda County Superior Court on behalf of petition-
ers Dajohn and Lifetime, an organization that assists low-income indi-
viduals with educational and training programs. 0 3
In their superior court challenge, the petitioners asserted that the
matter was a straightforward case of statutory interpretation of the GA
statutes under California law. 0 4 They argued that the goal of statu-
tory interpretation is to ascertain the legislature's intent so as to carry
out the purpose of the law.105 To determine statutory intent, the peti-
tioners argued, courts must look first to the language of the statute,
giving the words their usual, ordinary meaning.10 6 If there is no ambi-
guity, a court should presume that the legislature "meant what it
said."10 7 The petitioners contended that Dajohn is eligible for GA be-
cause WIC section 17000 mandates providing GA to "all .. . persons,"
not "all . . . adults," who are not supported and relieved by other
sources. 08 Accordingly, technical eligibility for ancillary CalWORKs
benefits does not relieve and support Dajohn as required by WIC sec-
tion 17000.109
In addition, the petitioners argued that because the legislature
had created explicit exemptions in others areas, the lack of an explicit
97 See Order Denying Petitioner's Writ of Mandate and Granting Petitioner's Cause of
Action for Declaratory Relief at 2-5, McCormick v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. RG08415945
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2009) (unpublished decision) [hereinafter McCormick Order],
available at http://apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/html/index.html; see also supra
INTRODUCTION (providing background on the situation at issue in McCormick).
98 McCormick Memorandum, supra note 1, at 2.
99 Id. at 1-2.
100 Id. at 3.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 3-4.
104 See id. at 4.
105 See id. at 4 (citing People v. Snook, 947 P.2d 808, 810 (Cal. 1997)).
106 See id. at 4-5 (citing Hunt v. Superior Court, 987 P.2d 705, 716-17 (Cal. 1999)).
107 Id. at 4-5 (citing Hunt, 987 P.2d at 716).
108 See id. at 5 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 17000 (West 2010)).
109 See id. at 9-10.
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categorical exclusion for children-or MFG children for that mat-
ter-in the WIC sections for GA further demonstrated the legisla-
ture's intent." 0 For example, the legislature prohibited adults who
have received their maximum sixty months of welfare assistance
through CalWORKs"I or who have drug-related sanctions" 2 from re-
ceiving GA." 3 The petitioners further stated that if a statute has ex-
plicit exemptions, then under the canon of statutory construction
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, a court should not infer additional
exemptions in the absence of clear legislative intent to do so.1i4
Finally, the petitioners contended that WIC recognizes that chil-
dren are authorized to receive GA." 5 Under WIC section 17300, a GA
recipient's "responsible relative" is required to reimburse the county
for the GA loan." WIC section 17300 defines "responsible relative"
as "the spouse of the recipient and parent of a minor child who is a
recipient.""'7
The court held that Dajohn was ineligible to receive GA." 8 It
noted that Dajohn "qualifies in every way for a GA cash aid grant ex-
cept one and it is disqualifying.""' 9 It concluded that Alameda County
Regulation section 9-2-0.1 disqualified him.120 The regulation states:
"An individual meets the age requirement for General Assistance eligi-
bility if he or she is . .. a minor who lacks a source of basic care and
support but does not qualify for any federal or state assistance pro-
gram." 21 The court held that even though Dajohn did not receive
any cash aid from CalWORKs, he still qualified for and participated in
CalWORKs.122 The court then simply stated that it "determine[d]
that GA Regulation § 9-2-0.1 is not inconsistent with California stat-
utes. Indeed, it is entirely consistent with the disincentive provision of
the CalWorks program found at California Welfare and Institutions
Code § 11450.04 that 'punishes' children like Petitioner, whose
110 See id. at 5.
Ii See WELF. & INST. CODE § 11454.
112 See id. § 11327.5.
113 See McCormick Memorandum, supra note 1, at 5.
114 See id. (citing Rojas v. Superior Court, 93 P.3d 260, 270-71 (Cal. 2004)).
115 See Petitioners' Reply to Respondents' Opposition to Motion for Writ of Mandate at
4, McCormick v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. RG08415945 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 26, 2009) (un-
published decision), available at http://apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/domainweb/html/in-
dex.html.
116 Id. (citing WELF. & INST. CODE § 17300).
117 Id. (quoting WELF. & INST. CODE § 17300).
118 See McCormick Order, supra note 97, at 2-3.
119 Id. at 3.
120 See id. at 5.
121 Id. at 3 (quoting ALAMEDA CNTy. GEN. ASSISTANCE REG. § 9-2-0.1 (revised July 19,
2010), http://www.alamedasocialservices.org/public/services/financial_assistance/GA_
Regulations/index.cfm)).
122 See id. at 5.
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mother knowingly bore additional children without the monetary
means with which to support them."12 3
C. Criticism of Family Caps
1. The Punitive Purpose of Family Caps
A prominent criticism of family caps is that one reason for enact-
ing family caps is the belief that welfare recipients, "lacking a sense of
responsibility and a stable family structure, require punitive restric-
tions to curtail their propensity to have numerous children for the
purpose of getting welfare benefits."l 24 Proponents of welfare caps
thus "argue that by withholding . . . benefits, the government can
transform present recipients into productive members of society,
thereby solving the intractable problems of poverty."1 25 Historically,
welfare policies have distinguished between the "deserving" poor and
"undeserving" poor and have justified punishing the latter to prevent
them from becoming dependent upon public aid.126 Legislators often
blame the "undeserving" poor for social problems and, accordingly,
base welfare reform policies such as family caps on the assumption
that these individuals do not deserve to have children. 127
123 Id. at 6. While the court in McCormick v. County of Alameda concluded that the
petitioner could not receive GA, an appellate court might disagree with the superior
court's conclusion that the county regulation and the GA statutes are not in conflict. In-
deed, the case is currently pending in appellate proceedings. See Receipt for Notice of
Appeal by DCA Filed, McCormick v. Cnty. of Alameda, No. RG08415945 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Dec. 17, 2009) (unpublished decision), available at http://apps.alameda.courts.ca.gov/
domainweb/html/index.html.
California courts have not hesitated to strike down county regulations limiting the
scope of the GA statutes. See cases cited supra note 96. Just as the California Supreme
Court in Mooney v. Pickett invalidated a county regulation that denied GA to unmarried
individuals on the sole basis that they were potentially employable, a California appellate
court may strike down this county regulation that denies relief to MFG children based on
their potential eligibility for ancillary CalWORKs benefits. See Mooney v. Pickett, 483 P.2d
1231, 1240-41 (Cal. 1971). As the court stated in Mooney, "To the man who cannot obtain
employment his theoretical employability is a barren resource; it is inedible; it provides
neither shelter nor any other necessity of life." Id. at 1238. Such is also the case for MFG
children who have theoretical CalWORKs eligibility. See McCormick Memorandum, supra
note 1, at 6.
124 Kaufman, supra note 36, at 313.
125 Williams, supra note 40, at 720.
126 See id. The Social Security Act originally allowed states to exclude African-Ameri-
cans from receiving welfare. See Williams, supra note 40, at 722.
127 See Broomfield, supra note 19, at 220 ("[O]ne theory behind welfare reform is
based on the same premise-that certain people in our society do not deserve to procre-
ate."); Kaufman, supra note 36, at 308 ("[M]yths which differentiate the 'undeserving' poor
from the 'deserving' poor justify punitive welfare policies on the basis that certain popula-
tions (unwed mothers, 'lazy' and shiftless paupers) are responsible for their poverty and
must be discouraged and prevented from depending upon public assistance.").
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2. The Myth of the "Welfare Queen"
A common misconception is that welfare recipients have more
children in order to receive additional welfare benefits.128 Social sci-
ence research indicates, however, that welfare recipients do not base
their childbearing decisions on receipt of welfare benefits.12 9 Al-
though methodological limitations make it difficult to study the im-
pact of family caps,' 30 one review of twenty-three studies "generally
show[ed] no direct relationship between AFDC benefit levels (or dif-
ferentials) and family size."13 1
Furthermore, the argument that family caps may discourage wel-
fare recipients from having more children in order to increase their
grant levels also presupposes that welfare recipients calculate how
their family-planning decisions affect their grant levels. It is nonsensi-
cal to argue that welfare recipients, who are often struggling to survive
from day to day, have the time and energy to fully learn the vast num-
ber of state and federal welfare regulations and apply those rules to
their reproductive decisions. 3 2 Consistent with this intuition, re-
search indicates that welfare recipients often do not understand the
welfare system and its labyrinth of regulations.13 3 For example, a 2001
study of Arizona's family cap found that between 29% and 37% of
Arizona's welfare recipients did not even know the family cap exis-
ted.' 34 Similarly, a 1997 study found that only 63% percent of Dela-
ware's welfare recipients were aware of Delaware's family cap.13 5 Even
if welfare recipients fully understand how their grant levels may vary
128 See Smith, supra note 20, at 156-57.
129 See MICHAEL J. CAMASSO ET AL., A FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF NEW JERSEY'S
FAMILY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 127-28 (1998) (citing studies that generally find no direct
correlation between benefit amounts and family size); Smith, supra note 20, at 157 ("Social
science research . . . consistently concludes that women on welfare do not have additional
children for the purpose of obtaining an increase in benefits."); see also Williams, supra
note 40, at 739-40 ("Empirical studies have consistently documented the lack of a correla-
tion between the receipt of AFDC benefits and the child-bearing decisions of unmarried
women-even for young, unmarried women.").
130 See JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & Soc. POLICY, OPEN QUESTIONS: NEW
JERSEY'S FAMILY CAP EVALUATION 2 (1999), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/
publications/files/0040.pdf.
131 CAMASSO ET AL., supra note 129, at 127-28 (quotations omitted).
132 See Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
643, 673 (2009) (stating that welfare recipients have a limited knowledge of welfare rules
and that "[i]n some states the rules are so complex that it is unlikely any welfare recipient
knows or fully understands them unless or until she finds herself subject to them.").
133 See id. (discussing how welfare recipients frequently do not understand welfare
rules).
134 See GREGORY MILLS ET AL., ABT Assocs. INC., EVALUATION OF THE ARIZONA EM-
POWER WELFARE REFORM DEMONSTRATION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 (2001), available at
http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/ES- 2 0 01367766680_93366.pdf.
135 See GREGORY MILLS ET AL., AST Assocs. INC., THE ABC EVALUATION: THE EARLY Eco-
NOMIC IMPACTS OF DELAWARE'S A BETTER CHANCE WELFARE REFORM PROGRAM 15 (1997),
available at http://www.abtassociates.com/reports/early-impacts.pdf.
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according to family size, it is unreasonable to believe that a welfare
recipient would choose to have another child-with all the corre-
sponding challenges and obligations-for a grant increase that could
be as little as $24 a month.13 6
3. Harmful Health Effects of Family Caps
Most welfare recipients live in dire poverty.'37 With the paltry
amount of aid that TANF provides, families frequently cannot afford
to obtain the basic necessities of life.' 38 While little research currently
exists on the health effects of family caps in particular, research indi-
cates that preventing families from receiving basic necessities by re-
ducing welfare benefits could lead to greater familial poverty, which
in turn contributes to "poor health, developmental, and social out-
comes" in children.139 For example, children in poverty are more
likely to experience health and physiological problems than more af-
136 See Smith, supra note 20, at 158; Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Miss.
DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., Div. OF ECON. ASSISTANCE [hereinafter Mississippi TANF], http://
www.mdhs.state.ms.us/eatanf.html (stating that the maximum monthly TANF benefit in
Mississippi is $110 for the first person, $36 for the second person, and $24 for each addi-
tional person) (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
137 See Smith, supra note 20, at 158.
138 See id. (stating that "the median benefit increase for a new child . . . is barely
enough to cover the monthly costs of diapers, formula, and clothing"); see also supra notes
82-83 and accompanying text (discussing grant levels in California); supra note 136 (dis-
cussing grant levels in Mississippi). Many states have frozen their TANF benefits at the
1996 levels, and for states that have increased the benefits, the amounts have not kept pace
with inflation. Liz SCHOTr & ZACHARY LEVINSON, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
TANF BENEFITS ARE Low AND HAVE NOT KEPT PACE WITH INFLATION 2 (2008), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/pdf/1 1-24-08tanf.pdf.
The 2009 federal poverty line in the contiguous forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia is $14,570 per year for a family of two and $18,310 per year for a family of three.
See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 74 Fed. Reg. 4199 (Jan. 23, 2009),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/09fedreg.pdf. Each state's benefit levels fall far
below the poverty line. See RowE & MURPHY, supra note 27, at 88-90 (listing states' benefit
levels). Research suggests that families require incomes that are twice the poverty level to
fully cover necessities such as food, housing, and utilities, and therefore, none of these
grants come even close to sufficiently providing for a family's basic needs. See NANCY K.
CAUTHEN & HSIEN-HEN Lu, NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, EMPLOYMENT ALONE IS
NOT ENOUGH FOR AMERICA'S Low-INCOME CHILDREN AND FAMILIEs 2 (2003), available at
http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_- 528.pdf. In one study of families with in-
comes below 200% of the poverty line, 18% stated that they had missed meals often or
sometimes, and 12.5% reported that they did not have enough food often or sometimes.
Of the families studied, 12.5% also reported that they had a family member who did not
receive medical care or had to delay medical care in the previous year. Twenty-five percent
stated that they were unable to pay their mortgage, rent, or utility bill. JOEL F. HANDLER &
YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 24 (2007) (citing
John Iceland & Kurt Baum, Income Poverty and Material Hardship: How Strong Is the Associa-
tion? (Nat'l Poverty Ctr. Working Paper Series No. 04-17 (2004)).
139 CAPPING A FAMILY'S BENEFITS, supra note 24, at 3.
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fluent children. 4 0 Through neural imaging and other testing, re-
searchers have also discovered cognitive deficits among impoverished
children.141 Finally, studies have shown that children in poverty have
a greater risk of developing social and emotional problems.14 2 Conse-
quently, by reducing the benefits families receive to spend on basic
necessities, family caps are likely to exacerbate the many mental and
physical health problems that children in poverty are already at in-
creased risk of developing.'4 3
III.
COURT CHALLENGES TO FAMILY CAPs
A. Federal Courts
Legal efforts to overturn state family cap policies in federal courts
have been unsuccessful. In Dandridge v. Williams, the Supreme Court
upheld the "maximum grant regulation" of Maryland's AFDC pro-
gram.' 44 This regulation imposed an upper limit on the grant
amount that a single family could receive.' 45 The plaintiffs, who were
AFDC recipients, contended that the regulation violated the Social Se-
curity Act, which provided that aid "shall . . . be furnished with reason-
able promptness to all eligible individuals,"146 as well as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 47 The Court held
that the regulation did not violate the Social Security Act because it
did not completely deprive children of the largest families of aid but
merely limited the overall size of the family grant. 48 Applying ra-
tional basis review, the Court further held that the regulation did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
140 See, e.g., David Wood, Effect of Child and Family Poverty on Child Health in the United
States, 112 PyDiATRics 707, 709 (2003) (citing Deborah A. Dawson, Family Structure and Chil-
dren's Health: United States, 1988, 7 VITAL HEALTH STAT. 1, 1-47 (1997)).
141 See, e.g., Mark M. Kishiyama et al., Socioeconomic Disparities Affect Prefrontal Function in
Children, 21 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1106, 1106 (2008).
142 See, e.g., KRISTEN ANDERSON MOORE ET AL., CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF: CHIL,
DREN IN POVERTY: TRENDS, CONSEQUENCES, AND PoLICY OPrIoNs 4 n.35 (2009) (citing W.
Jean Yeung et al., How Money Matters for Young Children's Development: Parental Investment and
Family Processes, 73 CHILD DEV. 1861, 1861-79 (2002)), available at http://www.childtrends.
org/Files//ChildTrends-009_04_07_RBChildreninPoverty.pdf.
143 See STARK & LEVIN-EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 15 ("Numerous studies have measured
the effects of poverty on child well-being; a family cap, by definition, would increase the
poverty of excluded children. To the extent that the family cap increases the poverty ex-
perienced by some families, it increases the likelihood that the child will experience the
well-documented negative effects of poverty such as: stunted growth from poor nutrition,
impaired educational development, and weakened family cohesion." (emphasis omitted)).
144 See 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
145 See id. at 473.
146 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (A) (1994) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 602 (1996)); see
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473.
147 See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 471, 473.
148 See id. at 480-81, 483.
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cause it was rationally related to the state's "legitimate interest in en-
couraging employment and in avoiding discrimination between
welfare families and the families of the working poor."1 49
In C.K. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, the plaintiffs,
who were AFDC recipients, challenged New Jersey's AFDC family cap
provision, which eliminated the standard increase in AFDC benefits
for a woman who gave birth to another child while receiving AFDC
benefits.o50 The plaintiffs challenged the family cap provision on
equal protection and due process grounds.151 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disposed of their claims and
upheld the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
Department of Health and Human Services. 52
The Third Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the pro-
gram should be subject to strict scrutiny.153 In doing so, it agreed with
the district court that the program does not unduly burden the plain-
tiffs' procreative choices because the program "in no way conditions
receipt of benefits upon [the] plaintiffs' reproductive choices."154 It
also agreed with the district court that the program is "rationally re-
lated to a legitimate governmental purpose, in that the state's interests
in giving AFDC recipients the same structure of incentives as working
people, promoting individual responsibility, and strengthening and
stabilizing the family unit are clearly legitimate."155 Finally, it con-
cluded that the district court was correct in holding that the welfare
program was rationally related to the legitimate state interests of "al-
tering the cycle of welfare dependency that it has determined AFDC
engenders in its recipients as well as promoting individual responsibil-
ity and family stability."156
B. State Courts
1. Federal Constitutional Rights
Challenges to family caps based on alleged violations of federal
constitutional rights have received a similarly hostile reception in state
courts. In an Indiana case, N.B. v. Sybinski, the plaintiffs were a
mother, N.B., her minor child, L.K, and a certified class of TANF re-
cipients who, because of the state's family cap, could not receive in-
149 Id. at 486.
150 See 92 F.3d 171, 177 (3d Cir. 1996).
151 See id.
152 See id. at 177-78, 195.
153 See id. at 194-95.
154 Id. at 194 (quoting C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1014 (D.N.J. 1995)).
155 Id. at 194.
156 Id. at 195 (quoting Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1015). The court also rejected the
petitioners' claim that the waiver for the family cap violated the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA). See id. at 181, 188-89.
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creased benefits after having given birth to another child.157 The
plaintiffs argued that the family cap violated their rights under the
Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated against children who
lived with their parents by treating them differently than children who
did not live with their parents.158 Under the family cap, children who
lived with their parents could not receive benefits, but children who
lived with a qualified caretaker other than their parents could receive
benefits. 15 9 The plaintiffs claimed that the family cap infringed upon
the fundamental right of family association and did not substantially
relate to permissible state objectives.160
The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the family cap should
be subject to strict scrutiny for infringing upon a fundamental
right.16 1 While conceding that the family cap "may have some inci-
dental effect on family structure," it declined to apply a heightened
level of review.' 62 The court analogized the case to Bowen v. Gilliard,
in which the Supreme Court, using rational basis review, upheld a law
that counted child support as income in the AFDC program even
though the law had an unintended effect on family association.16 3 In
Bowen, the Supreme Court concluded: "That some families may
choose to modify their living arrangements in order to avoid the ef-
fect of the amendment, does not transform the amendment into an
act whose design and direct effect are to intrude on choices concern-
ing family living arrangements."16 4 Similarly, the court in Sybinski
found that the family cap does not require a capped child to be re-
moved from the home but merely prevents the parents of a capped
child from receiving additional benefits for the child.165
The plaintiffs in Sybinski contended that the purpose of the family
cap was simply to discourage the birth of more children, which they
claimed was not a legitimate interest.16 6 On the other hand, the state
asserted that the family cap promoted a legitimate interest in "altering
the cycle of welfare dependency."16 7 It also contended that the family
cap "encourages self-sufficiency and personal responsibility, maintains
parity between welfare recipients and the working poor, and provides
incentives for family planning" and therefore passes the rational basis
157 N.B. v. Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
158 See id. at 1108.
159 See id.
160 Id. at 1112.
161 See id. at 1108.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 1108-09 (citing Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 601-02 (1987)).
164 Id. at 1109.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 Id.
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test. 168 The court agreed with the state and concluded: "[T]o give
TANF recipients the same structure of incentives as working people,
to promote individual responsibility, and to strengthen and stabilize
the family unit" are legitimate state interests.169
Finally, the court disposed of the plaintiffs' substantive due pro-
cess claim that the family cap "punishe [dj children by increasing their
poverty without any rational justification for that punishment that
would relate to a legitimate government interest."170 The court deter-
mined that the state has a legitimate interest in "reforming wel-
fare."171 Mirroring the reasoning in C.K v. Shalala,1 7 2 the district
court decision in C.K v. New Jersey Department of Human Services,173 the
court in Sybinski concluded that "the family cap does not punish chil-
dren for the behavior of their parents, nor does it completely deprive
children of benefits they might otherwise receive."174
2. State Constitutional Rights
State courts have also rejected challenges to family caps based on
alleged violations of state constitutional rights. In Sojourner A. v. New
Jersey Department of Human Services, a class of plaintiffs alleged that New
Jersey's family cap violated their rights to privacy and equal protection
under the NewJersey Constitution.17 5 The plaintiffs claimed that the
family cap infringed upon their right to privacy because it coerced
poor women into not having more children.17b They further con-
tended that the family cap violated their equal protection rights be-
cause certain classes of poor children could not receive welfare
benefits while, in contrast, other classes of similarly situated children
could-provided that their families did not begin receiving welfare
until after they were born.17 7
On appeal, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claims and affirmed
the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the NewJersey Depart-
168 See id.
169 See id. at 1110.
170 See id. at 1112-13.
171 Id. at 1113.
172 See 883 F. Supp. 991, 1013 (D.N.J. 1995).
173 92 F.3d 171 (3d Cir. 1996).
174 Sybinski, 724 N.E.2d at 1113 (citing Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1013). The court in
Shalala similarly concluded that NewJersey's family cap "does not direct the onus of paren-
tal conduct against the child, nor does it completely deprive children of benefits which
they might otherwise receive but for the conduct of their parents. Rather, NewJersey's cap
merely imposes a ceiling on the benefits accorded an AFDC household while permitting
any additional child to share in that 'capped' family income." Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at
1013.
175 See 794 A.2d 822, 824-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
176 See id. at 825.
177 See id. at 829.
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ment of Human Services.1 7" While the court's precedent required the
application of strict scrutiny if a regulation placed a "direct legal ob-
stacle" in the path of a woman's decision to have additional children,
the court nonetheless concluded that the family cap "did not deprive
women of the right or the ability to have children, but simply chose
not to subsidize the increased costs associated with the birth of an
additional child."' 7 9 It determined that the added burden that the
family cap imposed was not "substantial" and therefore did not re-
quire a heightened level of review.1s0 The court followed the reason-
ing from C.K. v. Shalala.'a' In Shalala, the court asserted that working
families do not receive increases in their wages when they have addi-
tional children, and therefore, families on welfare also should not re-
ceive increases in their welfare grants when they have additional
children.' 8 2 The court in Sojourner consequently found the family cap
to be "reasonably related to [the] legitimate governmental objectives
[of] breaking the cycle of poverty, promoting responsibility and self-
reliance, and decreasing welfare dependency and strengthening
families."'"
3. Calfornia
In Sneed v. Saenz, a California appellate court upheld the MFG
rule.18 4 The plaintiffs were welfare recipients with children subject to
the MFG rule who challenged the income-calculating procedures that
determined the grant amounts for children subject to the MFG
rule.'8 5 They claimed that the procedures violated their rights to pri-
vacy and equal protection.' 8 6 The court rejected the plaintiffs' claims
and concluded: "[T]he MFG statute has no coercive effect so as to
make it unconstitutional. Any impact on family living arrangements is
unintended, indirect and attenuated."'8 7 The court applied rational
basis review after determining that the case involved no fundamental
178 See id. at 824.
179 See id. at 833.
180 See id. at 833-34.
181 See id. at 830, 834 (citing Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1013-14).
182 See Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1013-14 ("Placing welfare households on a par with
working families is a reasonable and appropriate goal of welfare reform .... The Family
Cap, by maintaining the level of AFDC benefits despite the arrival of an additional child,
puts the welfare household in the same situation as that of a working family, which does
not automatically receive a wage increase every time it produces another child.").
183 Sojourner A., 794 A.2d at 824. The court also asserted that the family cap provision
does not "completely deprive either the family unit of the benefits it is already receiving, or
eliminate all benefits to the newborn child." Id. at 834.
184 120 Cal. App. 4th 1220, 1251 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
185 See id. at 1232-33.
186 Id. at 1248.
187 Id. at 1249.
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right or suspect classification.1 8 8 Applying this deferential standard of
review, the court held that "[t]he MFG statute is rationally related to
California's legitimate purposes: to encourage families to provide for
their own economic security by participating in the work force and to
provide sufficient support and protection for their children, with the
goal of ending the cycle of welfare dependence."189
IV.
PROBLEMS WITH FAMILY CAPS IN THE ZERO-
GRANT SITUATION
A. Flawed Legal Reasoning
When a family cannot receive any aid because of a family cap
even though the family has children who are otherwise eligible for
welfare funds, the operation of the family cap creates a situation that
contradicts the reasoning courts use to justify upholding the constitu-
tionality of family caps.
1. Not Completely Depriving Families of Welfare Benefits
Courts often assert that because the effect of the family cap is
only to make a family share the welfare resources of noncapped chil-
dren with capped children, the family cap does not completely de-
prive families of welfare funds. For instance, in N.B. v. Sybinski, the
court stated that "the family cap . . . does [not] completely deprive
children of benefits they might otherwise receive."190 Similarly, the
court in C.K v. Shalala concluded that New Jersey's family cap
"does . . . [not] completely deprive children of benefits which they
might otherwise receive but for the conduct of their parents. Rather,
NewJersey's cap merely imposes a ceiling on the benefits accorded an
AFDC household while permitting any additional child to share in
that 'capped' family income."191 Finally, the court in Sojourner A. v.
New Jersey Department of Human Services asserted that the family cap pro-
vision does not "completely deprive either the family unit of the bene-
fits it is already receiving, or eliminate all benefits to the newborn
child."' 9 2
Yet, as illustrated in Part II.B, a family cap actually does com-
pletely deprive a family of benefits in the zero-grant situation. For
example, a family receiving welfare benefits for a child may have an-
other child who is otherwise eligible for welfare benefits but cannot
receive those welfare benefits because of the family cap. If the first
188 See id. at 1249-50.
189 Id. at 1250.
190 724 N.E.2d 1103, 1113 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
191 883 F. Supp. 991, 1013 (D.N.J. 1995).
192 794 A.2d 822, 834 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
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child reaches the age limit or leaves the home to go into foster care,
the monthly grant becomes $0 because the noncapped child's welfare
eligibility does not transfer to the capped child. The family cap in the
zero-grant situation thus completely deprives the family of welfare
benefits, contradicting the reasoning that courts have used to uphold
family caps.
2. Putting Families on Welfare on Par with Working Families
Next, courts frequently analogize the situation of a family receiv-
ing welfare to that of a working family as a justification for upholding
the constitutionality of family caps. For example, the court in C.K v.
Shalala stated:
Placing welfare households on a par with working families is a rea-
sonable and appropriate goal of welfare reform . . . . The Family
Cap, by maintaining the level of AFDC benefits despite the arrival of
an additional child, puts the welfare household in the same situa-
tion as that of a working family, which does not automatically re-
ceive a wage increase every time it produces another child.1 9 3
This analogy is misleading because working families are in a dras-
tically different situation than families on welfare. When working fam-
ilies do not receive wage increases upon having additional children,
they likely can still manage to get by because they can use their in-
come to care for those children. Families on welfare, on the other
hand, receive barely enough to survive and are often desperately
struggling to avoid suffering a serious illness or becoming home-
less.1 9 4 Adding the costs of having another child to a family that is
already living on the edge-perhaps on as little as a few hundred dol-
lars a month-could seriously jeopardize that family's ability to buy
enough food or pay its rent.'9 5
Another problem with the courts' analogy is that not receiving an
increase in wages for a working family is a very different situation from
not receiving any wages at all. Likewise, not receiving an increase in
welfare benefits is much different from not receiving any welfare ben-
efits at all. The analogy fails when family caps completely deny fami-
lies any welfare benefits rather than simply make families share the
benefits of noncapped children with capped children.
In fact, taken to its logical conclusion, the analogy between work-
ing families and families on welfare would support providing at least
some benefits to families in the zero-grant situation. When working
families lose their employment and consequently do not receive any
wages at all, society provides those families with some form of finan-
193 Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1013-14.
194 See Smith, supra note 20, at 158-59.
195 1 am grateful to Ed Barnes for pointing out this problem with the courts' analogy.
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cial assistance, such as unemployment insurance or welfare benefits;
working families thus have a safety net to fall back on. However, the
consequences for families on welfare are disastrous when the safety
net upon which they rely completely disappears, as in the zero-grant
situation. Consequently, when families on welfare are subject to the
family cap in the zero-grant situation, society should provide them,
like working families, with at least some financial assistance.
B. Flawed Public Policy
Courts have articulated certain public policy goals as legitimate
state interests in their decisions upholding the constitutionality of
family caps.' 96 In the zero-grant situation, completely denying a fam-
ily of benefits almost certainly does not further a legitimate state inter-
est. The application of family caps in the zero-grant situation more
likely frustrates, rather than supports, these public policy goals.
1. Reducing Poverty
Courts have claimed that states have a legitimate interest in re-
ducing poverty and that family caps are rationally related to that inter-
est. For instance, the court in Sojourner A. v. New Jersey Department of
Human Services found New Jersey's family cap to be rationally related
to the legitimate state interest of "breaking the cycle of poverty."197
How family caps can promote this legitimate state interest in the
zero-grant situation is unclear. Families will most likely be unable to
escape poverty or the need for welfare if they do not receive any cash
assistance to purchase the basic necessities of life. Even when capped
families are not completely deprived of welfare benefits, the effects of
poverty on their children are profound. Research indicates that chil-
dren in poverty are more likely to suffer adverse health and physiolog-
ical effects.198 For example, impoverished children experience
increased rates of hospital admissions and disability days.' 99 One lon-
gitudinal study, examining thirteen-year-old children living in poverty,
found that their stress-regulatory mechanisms are compromised, plac-
ing more physiological strain on their organs and tissues than on
those of children who are not poor.200 Poor children are also more
196 See supra notes 144-89 and accompanying text.
197 See 794 A.2d 822, 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
198 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 140, at 709 (citing Dawson, supra note 141).
199 See, e.g., id.
200 See How the Physiological Effects of Poverty on Young Children Takes Its Toll on Health,
MED. NEWS TODAY (Nov. 8, 2007) [hereinafter Physiological Effects], http://www.medical
newstoday.com/articles/88 1 46.php. One of the study's authors explained: "These muted
responses of stress regulatory mechanisms, which are part of the cardiovascular system, not
only compromise the ability of the adolescents' bodies to respond to such stressors as
noise, poor housing and family turmoil but also indicate they are suffering from more
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likely to have low birth weight; poor nutrition; conditions such
asthma, anemia, and pneumonia; and increased exposure to environ-
mental toxins like toxic waste sites and lead paint.201
Children in poverty are also more likely to suffer severe cognitive
deficits. 2 0 2 For example, one study found significantly diminished
brain function in low-income nine- and ten-year-old children com-
pared to wealthier children. 203 The study found that the poorer chil-
dren suffered lesions in their prefrontal cortex, the brain region that
controls higher-level thinking and problem solving, which was similar
to that experienced by stroke patients. 204 One explanation for these
outcomes is that children from low-income families receive fewer cog-
nitively stimulating experiences necessary for their brain develop-
ment.2 0 5 As some experts have noted: "Because of economic
limitations, poor parents have more difficulty providing intellectually
stimulating facilities such as toys, books, adequate day-care, or pre-
school education that are essential for children's development."206
Impoverished children are also more likely to develop social
problems. 207 For example, poor children experience an increased
risk of behavioral problems such as impulsiveness, difficulty getting
along with others, aggression, and conduct disorder. 208 They are also
more likely to have emotional problems such as anxiety, depression,
and low self-esteem. 209 Literature on child development also indicates
that children in poverty attain much lower educational achievement
than children who are not poor.210 For instance, researchers have
found that children in poverty are more than twice as likely to drop
stress-induced physiological strain on their organs and tissues than other young peo-
ple . . . ." Id.
201 Effects of Poverty, Hunger, and Homelessness on Children and Youth, AM. PSYCHOL. Ass'N
[hereinafter Effects of Poverty], http://www.apa.org/pi/families/poverty.aspx (last visited
Sept. 28, 2010). Even after controlling for a number of demographic factors, experts have
concluded that poor children are more likely to have increased levels of lead in their
blood. SeeJ. Lawrence Aber et al., The Effects of Poverty on Child Health and Development, 18
ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 463, 475 (1997) (citing DebraJ. Brody et al., Blood Lead Levels in the
US Population, 272 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 277, 277-83 (1994)).
202 See, e.g., Kishiyama et al., supra note 141, at 1106.
203 See id.; see also Greg Toppo, Study: Poverty Dramatically Affects Children's Brains, USA
TODAY (Dec. 10, 2008), http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/200 8 -12-07-childrens-
brainsN.htm.
204 See id.
205 See Kishiyama et al., supra note 142, at 1113.
206 Aber et al., supra note 201, at 475.
207 See, e.g., MOORE ET AL.., supra note 142, at 4 (citing Yeung et al., supra note 142, at
1861-79); Effects of Poverty, supra note 201.
208 See MOORE ET AL., supra note 142, at 4; Effects of Poverty, supra note 201.
209 See MooRE ET AL., supra note 142, at 4; Effects of Poverty, supra note 201.
210 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 140, at 709.
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out of high school and almost twice as likely to be unemployed in
early adulthood.2 11
These grave effects could also have serious consequences for
capped children's ability to contribute to society. For example, stud-
ies have found that every dollar eliminated from a welfare grant re-
sults in an expected future economic loss by at least that amount due
to diminished future productivity. 212 According to one estimate, for
each year that children remain impoverished, society loses $130 bil-
lion in future economic output over those children's lifetime.213
Thus, society will save $26 billion for each year of poverty it ends. 214
Similarly, some economists estimate that child poverty costs the
United States $500 billion a year due to lost workforce productivity
and expenses for health care and the criminal justice system.215 One
expert explained the many costs of child poverty to society:
Schools pay for remedial education for poor children, businesses
pay for poorly educated and trained workers, consumers pay for
lower product and service quality, hospitals and social services pay
for the added mental and physical disabilities; citizens pay when
poor children grow up to become violent, and ultimately everyone
pays for all these losses.2 1 6
Several state legislatures have recognized that family caps do not
fulfill their ostensible public policy goals and have consequently elimi-
nated them. 2 17 These legislatures have concluded that among other
things, family caps do not reduce poverty among welfare recipients. 218
For example, during the Illinois House debate on the bill that elimi-
nated family caps in Illinois, one representative asserted that family
caps do not fulfill the "main goal" of welfare, which "is that the child is
supported and not living in poverty."219 Similarly, family caps among
211 See id. (citing Jeanne Brooks-Gunn & Greg J. Duncan, The Effects of Poverty on Chil-
dren, 7 FuTURE CHILD. 55, 55-71 (1997)).
212 See id. at 15, 27 n.64.
213 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 138, at 47 (citing ARLOC SHERMAN, POVERTY
MATTERS: THE COST OF CHILD POVERTY IN AMERICA 15 (1997)).
214 Id.
215 Effects of Poverty, supra note 201.
216 SHERMAN, supra note 213, at 14, quoted in HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 138, at
47.
217 See 23 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-2 (2003) (repealing Illinois' family cap); Romero &
Ag6nor, supra note 76, at 356 (stating that Nebraska repealed its family cap); Family Cap
Policies, supra note 74 (noting that neither Illinois nor Maryland still uses family cap
policies).
218 See, e.g., 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess., 39th Leg. Day, at 20 (Ill. Apr. 1, 2003) (not-
ing representatives' doubts that the family cap in Illinois had the effect it was expected to).
219 Id. at 20. A number of representatives also emphasized that family caps do not
impact welfare recipients' decisions to have more children. One representative stated,
"[A] lot of academic studies have shown us that welfare is not the reason low-income wo-
men have kids. And that the family cap does nothing to effect [sic] childbearing." Id.
Another representative concluded, "I think more education on family planning and other
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families in the zero-grant situation could very likely increase poverty
instead of furthering the goal of reducing poverty.
2. Strengthening Families
Courts have also claimed that family caps are rationally related to
the legitimate state interest of strengthening families on welfare. In
C.K. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, the court concluded
that "promoting . . . family stability" was a legitimate state interest.220
Similarly, the court in Sojourner A. v. New Jersey Department of Human
Services found "strengthening families" to be a legitimate state
interest. 221
Yet, it is difficult to understand how there can be any measure of
family stability in the zero-grant situation. When a family has no cash
resources to purchase essential items such as shoes, clothing, or
school supplies, this lack of income can lead to further familial insta-
bility due to any number of difficulties. Most prominent are problems
resulting from the children's diminished health, developmental, and
social capacities. 222 Poverty also contributes to "'abusive family
processes, parental depression and stress, and disruptions in caregiv-
ing' which can significantly compromise the safety and stability of a
child's home environment."2 23
Furthermore, some families in the zero-grant situation will suffer
another source of familial instability as a result of family caps. Even
though they desperately want to keep their family together, they will
have to choose to give up their children to foster care simply because
they do not have the financial resources to care for them.224 When
this happens, rather than supporting the public policy goal of
strengthening families, family caps lead to increased instability among
those families in the zero-grant situation.
things . .. would make a difference more than just saying we're not gonna pay." Id. at
20-21.
220 92 F.3d 171, 195 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1015
(D.N.J. 1995)).
221 794 A.2d 822, 824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
222 See CAPPING A FAMILY's BENEFITS, supra note 24, at 3; supra Part IV.B.1 (discussing
the effects of poverty on children).
223 STARK & LEVIN-EPSTEIN, supra note 57, at 14 (quoting CSR, INc., UNDERSTANDING
YOUTH DEVELOPMENT (1997)); see also Aber et al., supra note 201, at 476 (discussing how
parents' poverty-related stress affects their children's development).
224 See, e.g., McCormick Memorandum, supra note 1, at 3.
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V.
POTENTIAL LEGAL SOLUTIONS
A. Federal Legislative Solutions
1. Congressional Family Cap Prohibition
Congress should make a number of changes to TANF to demon-
strate its commitment to caring for America's neediest residents. 225
One change should be to end its practice of allowing states to use
family caps in their TANF programs. Congress should take a defini-
tive stance against family caps, which fail to fulfill their ostensible pur-
poses of reducing poverty and strengthening families.226 Just as
Illinois, Maryland, and Nebraska have recognized that family caps do
not achieve their intended public policy goals and have repealed
them,227 Congress should as well. Congress should eliminate family
caps by passing legislation to prohibit states from using them in their
TANF programs.
2. Federal Legislative Exception for the Zero-Grant Situation
If Congress is unwilling to enact a complete ban on family caps, it
should at least create an exception for the zero-grant situation. This
exception would leave a family cap intact but would provide some
amount of cash aid to families when they have otherwise eligible
capped children but no longer receive any aid for the children for
whom they were originally receiving aid. This exception would help
to safeguard against the most extreme health effects that children suf-
fer when their families cannot afford the basic necessities of life.
B. State Legislative Solutions
1. State Family Cap Prohibitions
States could also ban family caps on their own.2 2 8 Illinois, Mary-
land, and Nebraska have discontinued their family caps, 2 2 9 and other
states could follow their lead. One likely hurdle, however, is that
many states currently face record deficits and may be unwilling to dis-
continue their family caps if the elimination of those family caps
225 For a list of other changes Congress should consider making to TANF, see, for
example, TIMOTHY CASEY ET AL., LEGAL MOMENTUM, TANF REAUTHORIZATION ROUND II-
AN OPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE THE SAFETY NET FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN 3-9 (2009), avail-
able at http://www.legalmomentum.org/assets/pdfs/tanf-dvr-article.pdf (outlining several
problems with TANF that could be addressed).
226 See Smith, supra note 20, at 194.
227 See Romero & Ag6nor, supra note 76, at 356; RowE & MuRPHY, supra note 27, at 142;
Smith, supra note 20, at 154.
228 See Smith, supra note 20, at 193.
229 See Romero & Ag6nor, supra note 76, at 356; RowE & MURPHy, supra note 27, at 142;
Family Cap Policies, supra note 74.
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would have any immediate impact on their state budgets. 230 For this
reason, a congressional prohibition on states' use of family caps is po-
tentially a more viable solution, as discussed above in Part V.A.1, at
least until states realize that a healthy population ultimately creates
net gains.
2. State Legislative Exceptions for the Zero-Grant Situation
Like the federal legislative exception, if state leaders are unwill-
ing to enact a complete ban on family caps, they should create an
exception for the zero-grant situation. Again, this exception would
not eliminate a family cap, but it would permit families to receive
some amount of cash aid when they have otherwise eligible children
who are subject to a family cap but no longer receive aid for the chil-
dren for whom they were originally receiving aid. This exception
would likewise help to safeguard against the most severe health effects
that children suffer when their families cannot afford basic
necessities.
CONCLUSION
The history of welfare in the United States illustrates the stereo-
types and discrimination that often underlie welfare reform policies.
Family caps are a manifestation of the punitive nature of those reform
policies. Research suggests that family caps also do not fulfill their
purported goals of reducing poverty and strengthening families. In
fact, they often do the opposite, particularly when they completely de-
prive families of welfare benefits.
Such is the case for Dajohn, a child who is otherwise eligible for
CalWORKs but whose family cannot receive any cash assistance from
CalWORKs to purchase shoes, clothing, and school supplies for him.
The fact that family cap policies like the MFG rule can operate to
completely deprive an indigent family like Dajohn's of any cash re-
sources compounds an already dire situation for many individuals.
Not only does this situation undermine many courts' reasoning in up-
holding family caps, but it also makes little sense from a public policy
perspective due to the potentially grave effects on children's social,
developmental, and health needs.
Congress has the ability to remedy this situation. It could pro-
hibit states from implementing family caps in their TANF programs.
Alternatively, Congress could create an exception for the zero-grant
situation to provide some financial assistance to families that have eli-
gible children but are not receiving any cash grants because of a fam-
230 See, e.g., Wood, supra note 26 (discussing political clashes over California's budget
deficits).
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ily cap. States could also follow the lead of Illinois, Maryland, and
Nebraska and ban family caps on their own. Finally, states could cre-
ate an exception for the zero-grant situation. By reforming welfare
family cap policies, legislators can demonstrate their commitment to
helping the country's neediest residents, like Dajohn, obtain the basic
necessities of life.
